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TAXATION SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
This Survey examines selected 1994 opinions and unpublished orders' of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involving matters of federal tax law.2 The
Survey begins with an examination of two cases involving deductions. Part II
of the Survey addresses Brooks v. United States,3 involving the question of
whether a stock option was a qualified stock option eligible for preferential
income tax treatment. Part III explores the energy property credit for recycling
equipment which was formerly available under the Code. The Survey contin-
ues with a look at cases involving administration matters, penalties and inter-
est, last known addresses, refunds, bankruptcies, and criminal prosecutions.
Part XI of the Survey concludes with the annual round up of tax protestor
cases.
I. DEDUCTIONS
A. Black Gold Energy Corp. v. Commissioner
In Black Gold, the Tenth Circuit addressed the interplay of the worthless
business debt deduction of I.R.C. § 166 (1988) and the "economic perfor-
mance" rules of I.R.C. § 461(h)(1) (West Supp. 1994).' The taxpayer in Black
Gold guaranteed two obligations of Tonkawa Refinery of Oklahoma, an affili-
ated corporation.6 When the underlying obligations went into default, Black
Gold was forced to defend lawsuits brought by two creditors in 1984. The suit
settled in early 1985. In settlement of the litigation, Black Gold paid $850,000
to one creditor and delivered a promissory note payable over nine years to the
other creditor.7
Black Gold first asserted that it was entitled to a worthless business debt
1. The Tenth Circuit has concluded that
[c]itation of these unpublished decisions is not favored. Nevertheless, if it is believed
that an unpublished opinion or order and judgment has persuasive value with respect to
a material issue in a case and would aisist the court in its disposition, the decision may
be cited, provided that a copy of the decision is attached to the brief or other document
in which it is cited, or, if cited in oral argument, is provided to the court and all other
parties.
General Order of November 29, 1993, superseding 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995,
or further order.
2. This Survey examines the areas of federal income, estate, and gift taxation.
3. 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 50,399 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 779 F. Supp. 512 (D. Kan.
1991).
4. No. 93-9002, 1994 WL 139019 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1994), aff g 99 T.C. 482 (1992).
5. Id.
6. Black Gold Energy Corp. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 482, 484 (1992).
7. Id. at 484-85.
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deduction8 in 1984, the year Tonkawa defaulted and Black Gold became lia-
ble under the guarantees.9 Black Gold argued that as an accrual basis taxpay-
er, it could deduct the entire amount of the debt settled in 1984, when the so-
called "all events" test was satisfied,'0 notwithstanding that it had made no
actual payments on the guarantee." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
however, pointed to Treasury Regulations which stated the deduction is avail-
able only in the year in which payment is actually made.' Black Gold con-
tended that these Regulations only apply to cash basis taxpayers.' 3 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with the IRS and concluded that the Regulations applied equally
to accrual basis taxpayers.' 4
Black Gold alternatively argued it was entitled to a bad debt deduction in
1985, the year that it delivered its promissory note to the creditor. 5 The abil-
ity of Black Gold to claim a bad debt deduction in 1985 was complicated by
I.R.C. § 461(h)(1), which states that the "all events" test is not to be treated as
met any earlier than when "economic performance" occurs with respect to the
item sought to be deducted. 6 Under circumstances where the liability of the
taxpayer requires it to provide property or services, the Code further provides
that "economic performance" occurs only when, and as, the taxpayer in fact
provides such property or services. 7 Black Gold argued that its delivery of
8. A guarantor may deduct payments made under its guarantee, if at all, under I.R.C. § 166,
and not under the more general loss rules of 1.R.C. § 165 (1988). Putnam v. Commissioner, 352
U.S. 82 (1956). In Putnam, the Supreme Court held that losses sustained by a guarantor are "bad
debts" under I.R.C. § 166 because, upon payment under the guarantee, the guarantor becomes
subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the debtor. Id. at 85. Thus, a "debt" arises between
the debtor to the guarantor, which is governed by the bad debt rules of I.R.C. § 166. Id. Only
when this debt becomes worthless can the guarantor claim a bad debt deduction under I.R.C. §
166. The loss can be deducted as an ordinary loss if the debt is a so-called "business debt," or less
beneficially, as a short-term capital loss if the debt is a "nonbusiness debt." I.R.C. § 166(d).
9. Black Gold, 99 T.C. at 485-86.
10. Under the accrual method of accounting, deductions are allowable for the "taxable year
in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability" giving rise to such
deduction and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1987) (emphasis added).
11. Black Gold also argued that neither guarantee agreement contained a right of subrogation
in favor of Black Gold Energy against Tonkawa; therefore, no "debt" arose between Tonkawa and
Black Gold, and I.R.C. § 166 was not applicable. Black Gold, 99 T.C. at 484. The Tax Court
concluded otherwise, stating that "whether a guarantor achieves technical subrogation or. not, the
guarantor's loss arises by virtue of the worthlessness of the debtor's obligation to the guarantor."
Id. at 487.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-9(a) (1983) provides that "a payment of principal or interest made
during a taxable year ... by the taxpayer in discharge of part or all of the taxpayer's obligation as
a guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor is treated as a business debt becoming worthless in the tax-
able year in which the payment is made." Id.
13. Black Gold, 99 T.C. at 485. Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of ac-
counting, "all items which constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property, or
services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received. Ex-
penditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
l(c)(l)(i) (1993).
14. Black Gold, 1994 WL 139019 at *2.
15. Id.
16. I.R.C. § 461(h)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). The section was added to the Code as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984). Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 598-600 (1984).
17. I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(B).
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the promissory note satisfied the economic performance requirement referred
to by the Code. 8 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that "true econom-
ic performance under the settlement was the payment of the note, not its exe-
cution and delivery."' 9 Thus, Black Gold was not entitled to a bad debt de-
duction in 1985, and could only claim the deduction as it actually made pay-
ments under the note.2 °
B. True v. United States
21
The taxpayers in True were partners and shareholders in various partner-
ships and S corporations, through which they conducted business.2 The IRS
made certain adjustments to the taxpayers' taxable incomes. The adjustments
apparently arose out of increases made to the reported incomes of the partner-
ships and S corporations and flowed through to the taxpayers' personal income
tax returns.23 The taxpayers paid the resulting deficiency plus statutorily re-
quired interest on the deficiency.24
The taxpayers argued that since most of the deficiency interest paid to the
IRS was attributable to adjustments made to the reported operations of the
businesses, they should be entitled to deduct the interest as an "above the line"
business expense25 without being subject to the Code's restrictions on the
deduction of personal interest. 26 This is the rule when, for example, a tax-
payer operates his business as a sole proprietorship.27 The IRS countered that,
18. Black Gold, 1994 WL 139019 at *2.
19. Id.
20. Black Gold could, of course, deduct the $850,000 actually paid to the first creditor in
1985.
21. No. 93-8092, 1994 WL 461279 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994).
22. Id. at*1.
23. Id. A partner in a partnership must include on his personal income tax return his alloca-
ble share of the partnership's income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits which are "passed
through" to the partner. I.R.C. § 704 (West Supp. 1994). Likewise, a shareholder in a so-called "S
corporation", see I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994), must include his pro rata share
of the corporation's income, losses, deductions, and credits, as well as certain other items. I.R.C. §
1366 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
24. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *1. See also I.R.C. § 6601 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
25. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *1 (pursuant to I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994)).
26. The deductibility of interest generally turns on the classification of the interest: "invest-
ment interest" is generally deductible only to the extent of net investment income, see I.R.C.
§ 163(d) (West Supp. 1994); "qualified residence interest" consists of either acquisition indebted-
ness or home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the taxpayer, subject
to various definitional and other limitations, see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(West Supp. 1994); interest paid
or accrued on indebtedness allocable to a trade or business is generally fully deductible; or "per-
sonal interest," generally, all types of consumer interest other than the foregoing, is fully nonde-
ductible for 1991 and later tax years, see I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) (West Supp. 1994). The actual contro-
versy in True centered around the taxpayers' liability for alternative minimum tax, and the further
limitations placed on nonbusiness interest under I.R.C. 56(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1994) for purpos-
es of computing a taxpayer's alternative minimum tax liability. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *1-2.
27. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 305 (D.N.D. 1993). Thus, to the extent
deficiency interest paid to the IRS is attributable to a deficiency arising out of the operations of
the sole proprietorship, the interest is deductible as a business expense under I.R.C. § 162, provid-
ed it qualifies as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense." See Miller v. United States, 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 50,068 (D.N.D. 1994) (while not subject to the "personal interest" limita-
tions, expenditure nevertheless was not deductible under I.R.C. § 162).
1995]
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unlike sole proprietorships, partnerships and S corporations are separate legal
entities undertaking separate business operations, and that if a deduction was
allowable at all for the deficiency interest as a business expense, the deduction
would belong to the entity." Because such entities do not separately compute
their tax liability, they cannot bear responsibility for deficiency interest. Under
the IRS view, therefore, the deficiency interest could only be claimed as a
"below the line" personal deduction by the taxpayers. 9 This apparently re-
sulted in the taxpayer's interest deductions being in excess of the interest
deduction limitations of the Code.3
In a brief, unreported decision, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the IRS.3
Adopting the government's argument, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that partner-
ships and S corporations are separate legal, non-taxable entities that separately
compute and report the results of their operations. This makes them distin-
guishable from sole proprietorships.32 The nature, therefore, of the interest
deduction to the taxpayers in the instant case was strictly personal and was not
a business deduction. The interest must therefore be deducted, if at all, as an
itemized deduction subject to the personal interest deduction limitations.3
II. STOCK OPTIONS
A. Brooks v. United States34
The taxpayer in Brooks held a stock option to purchase 60,000 shares of
the common stock of Clinton Oil Company. Brooks's stock option was issued
under a plan adopted by the company irr 1974 and was exercised by Brooks in
1980. The controversy arose when Brooks filed a complaint in district court
seeking a refund of tax paid.33
Under the federal tax law in effect at the time,36 such options were eligi-
28. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *2.
29. "Below the line" deductions include, inter alia, personal itemized deductions for interest
to the extent allowable under I.R.C. § 163. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (West Supp. 1994).
30. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *2.
31. The Tenth Circuit affirmed an unreported district court order that had granted summary
judgment to the government. Id. at * 1.
32. Id. at *3. Both partnerships and S corporations file informational returns with the IRS.
Partnerships file on Form 1065 and S corporations file on Form 1120S. These forms are the basis
for calculating the taxable income or loss that flows through to the partners and shareholders. The
Schedule K-1 attached to each partner's or shareholder's income tax return reflects the income or
loss passed through.
33. Id.
34. 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9 50,399 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 779 F. Supp. 512 (D. Kan.
1991).
35. Brooks, 1994-2 U.S, Tax Cas. (CCH) T 50,399, at 85,396.
36. Under the rules of former I.R.C. §§ 421 and 422, preferential tax treatment was extended
to "qualified stock options" meeting certain statutory requirements. I.R.C. §§ 421, 422 (1988)
(amended 1990). These rules contrasted with the general tax treatment of stock options under
I.R.C. § 83 (West Supp. 1994). Under the rules of former I.R.C. §§ 421 and 422, neither the grant
nor the exercise of a qualified stock option resulted in taxable income to the recipient. Only when
the stock acquired on exercise was ultimately disposed of was a tax imposed at capital gains tax
rates based on the difference between the sale price of the stock and its basis in the optionee's
hands (generally, the exercise price). I.R.C. §§ 421, 422. Former I.R.C. § 422 was repealed in
1990, but had been something of a deadwood provision for some time prior to that because under
[Vol. 72:3
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ble for preferential income tax treatment if they were so-called "qualified
stock options" under a series of requirements then set forth in the Code.37
One requirement stated that the options must have been issued pursuant to a
plan reflecting certain features and option terms. Further, the plan must have
been "approved by the stockholders of the granting corporation within 12
months before or after the date" the plan was adopted by the company (e.g.,
by its board of directors).3"
The question whether the stockholders of Clinton Oil had approved the
stock option plan within the required time period was clouded by the fact that
the company had been the target of an enforcement action by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.39 Under the terms of the settlement with the
SEC, the company agreed that it would be subject to judicial supervision by
Judge Wesley E. Brown.' Subsequently, on March 18, 1974, Clinton's board
of directors adopted the stock option plan under which Brooks's option was
later granted.4 ' According to the taxpayer, the plan was submitted to Judge
Brown and approved by him at a March 1974 meeting with Clinton manage-
ment. No written record of such a meeting existed. 42 The plan was not pre-
sented to Clinton's stockholders within the required 12 month period.43
Under Brooks' theory, Judge Brown's approval, if given, was sufficient to
constitute approval by the shareholders of the company, because Judge Brooks
was representing the interests of the shareholders at the time. Therefore,
Brooks' stock option was a qualified stock option, and the exercise of that
option did not give rise to a taxable event. The government, on the other hand,
asserted that because the plan was not actually submitted to or approved by
the shareholders, as required by the literal language of the statute, the option
was not a qualified stock option and the exercise of the option was a taxable
event."
its express terms, I.R.C. § 422 did not apply to options issued after May 20, 1976. I.R.C. §
422(b).
37. Under the current Code, "qualified stock options" have been replaced by so-called "in-
centive stock options," which are described in I.R.C. § 422 (West Supp. 1994). The tax treatment
of incentive stock options under current law closely resembles that of qualified stock options
under old law. Incentive stock options were originally governed by I.R.C. § 422A, which was
redesignated as I.R.C. § 422 in 1990 when the old I.R.C. § 422 was repealed.
38. Under then-applicable Treasury Regulations, such approval was required to
comply with all applicable provisions of the corporate charter and bylaws, and the law
of the State of incorporation and must represent the express consent of stockholders
holding at least a majority of the voting stock of the corporation voting by person or by
proxy at a duly held stockholders' meeting.
Former Treas. Reg. § 1.422-2(b)(1).
An identical rule governs the approval of plans under which incentive stock options are
granted. See I.R.C. 422(b)(1) (1988). Thus, the holding in Brooks would presumably have equal
relevance to incentive stock option plans under current law.
39. Brooks, 766 F. Supp. at 994. The SEC filed an injunction proceeding in 1973. Id.
40. United States District Court, District of Kansas. The SEC had originally sought ap-
pointment of a receiver, but because Clinton's oil and gas concessions were subject to cancellation
upon appointment of a receiver, the SEC and Clinton's management agreed to the appointment of
Judge Brown as a "judicial supervisor." Brooks, 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,399, at 85,397.
41. Brooks, 766 F. Supp. at 995.
42. Id. at 997.
43. Id. at 995.
44. Id. at 996. The resulting taxable income would be measured by the difference between
1995]
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The district court concluded .that, despite the express language of the
statute requiring stockholder approval, "Judge Brown had the authority to
exercise stockholder approval within the meaning" of the statute.45 The dis-
trict court thus rejected a strict interpretation of the statute, concluding a con-
trary result would not further the legislative purpose of the statute.' The dis-
trict court further held that, based on the record - which included a deposi-
tion of Judge Brown taken by the taxpayer - Judge Brown did in fact ap-
prove the plan at the March 1974 meeting.47
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's
finding that Judge Brown had approved the plan was "clearly erroneous."
'
The court of appeals concluded that "even if [Judge Brown's] approval could
satisfy the requirements of [the statute,] there is simply no evidence in the
record that Judge Brown approved the plan on behalf of the shareholders for
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) purposes."'49 Reviewing the record, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the "approval" alleged to have been given by Judge
Brown at the March 1974 meeting was at best given in only a very general
manner, and was not intended by Judge Brown to be a substitute for specific
shareholder approval if required.5t The court of appeals thus did not view the
general approval of the plan given by Judge Brown as rising to the level of
the stockholder approval required by the Code.
the fair market value of the stock on the date of exercise and the exercise price. I.R.C. § 83 (West
Supp. 1994). See also Treas. Reg. §1.83-7 (1978).
45. Brooks, 766 F. Supp. at 997.
46. Id. at 998.
47. Id. The district court originally ruled that the record was insufficient to support such a
conclusion, and granted summary judgment for the government. Id. at 998. However, the taxpayer
successfully obtained leave to conduct further discovery, and after taking Judge Brown's deposi-
tion, submitted it to the court. Based on the additional information reflected in the deposition, the
court granted the taxpayer's motion to reconsider the earlier summary judgment. Brooks v. United
States, 779 F. Supp 512 (D. Kan. 1991). After the subsequent trial, the district court ruled that
Judge Brown had in fact approved the plan. Brooks v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.
Kan. 1992).
48. Brooks, 1994-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) l 50,399, at 85,398. Under the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court's findings of fact "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Thus, the trial court's
findings of fact will be upheld unless the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake has been
made. See Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir.
1990); LeMaire ex rel. LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987). The Su-
preme Court has instructed that "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
49. Brooks, 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,399 at 85,398.
50. Id. at 85,399. The court considered several other factors as well: the tax consequences of
the plan were not discussed at the meeting, nor was the need to obtain shareholder approval either
from Judge Brown or the shareholders themselves; the plan itself stated that stockholder approval
was required within 12 months after its adoption; and Judge Brown routinely approved any matter
brought to him by Clinton management unless the SEC had an objection, and so did not exercise




A. Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner5'
Pepcol Manufacturing provided the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to
review the standards under which "legislative regulations" of the government
may be held invalid.52 On its 1980 Federal income tax return, the taxpayer in
Pepcol Manufacturing claimed the special "energy property" investment tax
credit which then extended to qualifying "recycling equipment."53 The IRS
disallowed the credit, but the Tax Court sided with the taxpayer and held the
credit was available. 4 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.55
Pepcol Manufacturing Co. was engaged in, inter alia, the processing of
animal bones, obtained from local slaughterhouses, into gelatin bone, which is
used in the photographic industry as a raw material for use as a coating on
film.56 Pepcol maintained that its facility for processing bones was "recycling
equipment" and thus, eligible for the energy property credit.57 Noting that
there were four requirements to obtain the tax credit in respect to "recycling
equipment," the Tax Court focused on the first two of these requirements."
The court first addressed whether the process constituted "recycling." The
government's argument was that the term recycling envisioned only processes
under which waste products are processed back into their original form, such
as paper waste (e.g., newsprint) back into paper, metal waste (e.g., cans and
other containers) back into metal, and the like.59 Under the IRS view, this
"same type" or "similar end-product" requirement was supported by the legis-
lative history to the energy credit, which had articulated several examples of
recycling, all of which fell into this category.' Calling the dispute a "seman-
tical orgy," the Tax Court rejected the IRS's restrictive reading of the term
51. 13 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 98 T.C. 127 (1992).
52. Treasury regulations can be either "interpretative" or "legislative." An interpretative
regulation is issued pursuant to the Secretary of the Treasury's general authority to "prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Code. I.R.C. § 7805 (West Supp. 1994).
Legislative regulations are those issued in response to provisions of the Code "that describe the
intended law in extremely general terms, expressly leaving it to the Secretary of the Treasury to
interpret the provisions in regulations." Fred Feingold and Mark E. Berg, Whither the Branches?,
44 TAX L. REV. 205 (1989). Such Regulations "are of a quasi-legislative character; Congress has
chosen to delegate to the Treasury authority it might have exercised itself." WILLIAM A. KLEIN,
JOSEPH BANKMAN, Er. AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 68 (8th ed. 1990).
53. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1994). The credit, which ex-
pired in 1985, was equal to 10 percent of the taxpayer's investment in qualifying property. I.R.C.
§ 46(a)(2) (amended 1990).
54. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 127, 137 (1992).
55. Pepcol Mfg., 13 F.3d at 355.
56. Pepcol Mfg., 98 T.C. at 128. Gelatin bone is also used as a coating of pharmaceutical
products and as an ingredient in food products such as gelatin. Id.
57. Id. at 130.
58. Id. The court summarized the requirements of former I.R.C. § 48(l)(6) as follows: (1) the
process must have constituted recycling; (2) the equipment must be used exclusively to process
or sort and prepare solid waste for processing; (3) the item produced in the process must be the
first marketable product; and (4) the product to be processed cannot contain more than 10 percent
virgin material. Id. The parties were in agreement that requirements (3) and (4) were met. Id.
59. Id. at 131-32.
60. See S. Rep. No. 95-435, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7855, 8014.
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recycling and held that Pepcol's processing of animal bones constituted recy-
cling for these purposes.6
The second requirement examined by the Tax Court was that Pepcol's
equipment must have been used exclusively to process or sort and prepare
"solid waste" for processing. The applicable regulations in effect specifically
provided that "solid waste," for purposes of the recycling equipment credit,
excluded "animal waste," and on this alternative ground the IRS had disal-
lowed Pepcol's credit.6 2 The Tax Court acknowledged that Treasury Regula-
tions, including "legislative regulations" such as these, are to be "sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes, and
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons."'63 The court nevertheless
concluded that for various reasons the Regulations were invalid.' The Tax
Court's holding meant that the energy credit for recycling equipment was
available to Pepcol in respect of its bone processing equipment.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the strength of the
second requirement.65 Taking issue with the court below, the court of appeals
found the applicable regulations to be "not unreasonable or plainly inconsistent
with Congress' intent in enacting" the relevant statutory provisions.' Because
the IRS position reflected in the Regulations was therefore permissible, "the
Tax Court was constrained to follow it and erred as a matter of law in failing
to do so."67 The Tenth Circuit thus overturned the Tax Court's conclusion
that the Regulations were invalid. Noting that Pepcol had "for some reason"
stipulated that the bones were "animal waste," the court held that Pepcol was
therefore "not entitled to a recycling tax credit under the regulation."68
IV. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT 9
A. Gardner v. United States
70
The taxpayer in Gardner filed a quiet title action in federal district court,
seeking clear title to certain property that had belonged to her ex-husband and
61. Pepcol Mfg., 98 T.C. at 132-33.
62. Pepcol Mfg., 13 F.3d at 356. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.4 8-9(g)(1) (1987).
63. Pepcol Mfg., 98 T.C. at 133 (quoting Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969).
64. Id. at 134-37.
65. Pepcol Mfg., 13 F.3d at 357.
66. Id. "This Court has held that Treasury regulations are generally presumed to be valid and
'are not to be invalidated except for weighty reasons.' The 'presumption of validity is even
greater' where regulations have been issued pursuant to a specific legislative authorization." Id.
(citations ommitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 356-57.
69. In addition to the cases described in the text, the Tenth Circuit has decided numerous
cases concerning administration and enforcement. See e.g., Burge v. United States, No. 94-1063,
1994 WL 596586 (loth Cir. Nov. 1, 1994) (upholding dismissal of taxpayer's suit against IRS for
wrongful levy under doctrine of sovereign immunity); Hancock v. Commissioner, No. 94-9001,
1994 WL 582140 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1994) (upholding dismissal of Tax Court petition for failure
to prosecute); United States v. Boucher, No. 93-1453, 1994 WL 446780 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1994)
(affirming district court's determination of taxpayer's tax liability over objection that he was not
given the opportunity to participate in the underlying trial).
70. 34 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1994).
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had been awarded to her in a divorce. The IRS claimed a federal tax lien
against this property." Billie and Terryl Gardner commenced a divorce action
in Kansas on January 22, 1985.72 On August 4, 1986, the IRS filed a Notice
of Federal Tax Lien for taxes assessed against Billie three days earlier." The
divorce decree was entered on January 12, 1987, granting virtually all the
marital property, including the property in question, to Terryl.74 On December
7, 1990, Terryl filed the instant action.
A federal tax lien attaches "only to the property interests of the delinquent
taxpayer at the time of assessment.",71 The government, therefore, merely
steps into the shoes of the taxpayer, and cannot accede to a property interest
greater than that held by the taxpayer.76 Thus, the remaining questions in-
volved the nature of the property rights held by Billie on August 1, 1986, after
the divorce was filed but was still pending, and whether it was sufficient for a
federal tax lien to attach to it. Resolution of the matter was acknowledged to
be a pure question of Kansas state law. 7' Examining Kansas law,7" the Tenth
Circuit concluded that upon the filing of a divorce decree in that state, both
spouses become the owners of a vested, but as yet undetermined, interest in all
the marital property, whether jointly or individually held.79 This species of
common or joint ownership is to be ultimately unraveled by the trial court
when the divorce decree is entered and the property is finally divided. This
determination, in essence, relates back to the filing of the divorce decree, with
the result that the property interest adjudicated in the divorce decree is seen to
retroactively vest on the date the divorce action was filed.
Applied to the instant case, this doctrine of relation back meant that, be-
cause Billie was ultimately determined in the divorce decree to have no inter-
est in the subject property, he did not have any property interest to which the
government's lien could attach in August 1986 while the divorce was pending.
Thus, Billie "had no rights to the property in question when the IRS made its
assessment against him, no tax lien could attach, and [Terryl] owns that prop-
71. id. at 985. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988) provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects
or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount... shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
The lien secures the amount of the deficiency, plus any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, assessable penalty, and costs. Id. The general rule under the Code is that the general federal
tax lien arises at the time assessment is made. I.R.C. § 6322 (1988). Assessments are little more
than bookkeeping notations entered by the IRS on the taxpayer's account indicating that the
amount has been administratively determined to be due and payable. The lien continues until the
liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of
time. Id.
72. Gardner, 34 F.3d at 985.
73. Id. at 986.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 987 (citing United States v. Wingfield, 822 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir. 1987)).
76. See 4 BORIS I. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFrs $ 111.5.4
(1981) ("[Tlhe tax collector not only steps into the taxpayer's shoes but must go barefoot if the
shoes wear out.").
77. Gardner, 34 F.3d at 986.
78. Id. at 987 (citing Smith v. AIFAM Enters., 737 P.2d 469, 472, 474 (Kan. 1987) and
Cady v. Cady, 581 P.2d 358 (Kan. 1978)). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-201(b) (Supp. 1994).
79. Gardner, 34 F.3d at 987 (citing Cady, 581 P.2d at 362-63).
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erty free of any such liei."'
B. Codner v. United States"'
The taxpayer in Codner filed a petition to quash several administrative
summonses served by the IRS 2 on various third-party recordkeepers s3 The
summonses were to determine if the taxpayer was in violation of the Internal
Revenue laws. 4 Affirming an unreported District Court determination, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the summonses had been issued in compliance
with the applicable statutory requirements 5 and were to be enforced, over the
taxpayer's objections that (1) the special agent who issued the summons ex-
ceeded his authority in doing so,6 and (2) the copies of the summonses de-
livered to the taxpayer were required to be attested
8 7 but were not.88
C. Home of Faith v. Commissioner 9
The Internal Revenue Code provides that partnership audits are to be
conducted at the entity level, and not the partner level." However, partner-
ships with less than ten partners, each of whom is a natural person, are exempt
from these entity-level audit and litigation procedures.9' The Code's treatment
of S corporations is analogous to the tax treatment of partnerships,92 and in
recognition of this, I.R.C. § 6244 states that the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 6221-
80. Id. at 989.
81. 17 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 1994).
82. The IRS has broad powers to issue such summons in support of its efforts to ferret out
unreported tax liabilities. See I.R.C. §§ 7601 and 7602 (1988).
83. For the rules delineating third-party recordkeepers, see I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (1988).
84. Codner, 17 F.3d at 1332.
85. Under relevant standards, a summons will be enforced if the IRS can show "that the
investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant
to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession,
and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed." United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). The government therefore need not meet a "reasonable cause"
standard. The burden on the government is slight, and is generally met through the affidavit of the
agent issuing the summons. See, e.g., United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388,
389 (10th Cir. 1981).
86. The court concluded that while the IRS's own rules precluded revenue agents from is-
suing summonses without prior approval of their supervisors, this prohibition did not apply to
special agents. Codner, 17 F.3d at 1333.
87. An attested copy is "one which has been examined and compared with the original, with
a certificate or memorandum of its correctness, signed by the persons who have examined it."
Mimick v. United States, 952 F.2d 230, 232 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Accord Henderson v. United
States, 778 F. Supp. 274, 277 (D.S.C. 1991)).
88. Codner, 17 F.3d at 1332-33. The summonses served on the recordkeepers in Codner had
been attested, but the copies sent to Codner had not. In Mimick, neither the summons served on
the third party nor the copy sent to the taxpayer was attested, and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that both must be attested. Mimick, 952 F.2d at 231-32. Parsing through the techni-
cal requirements of I.R.C. §§ 7603 and 7609(a), which set forth the attestation rules relevant to
summonses, the Tenth Circuit concluded that only the summons sent to the recordkeeper must be
attested. See Codner, 17 F.3d at 1333.
89. 39 F.3d 263 (10th Cir. 1994).
90. I.R.C. § 6221-6231 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
91. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1) (1988).
92. See I.R.C. § 704 (West Supp. 1994).
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6231 which relate to (1) assessing deficiencies and filing claims for refund
with respect to partnership items, and (2) the judicial determination of part-
nership items, are made equally applicable to "subchapter S items." '93 Wheth-
er or not the rule of I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1)(B) also applies to S corporations by
analogy, such that S corporations with fewer than ten shareholders are exempt
from the entity-level audit rules, was the issue in Home of Faith.94 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals previously ruled that the exemption does apply,95
while the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that it does not.96
In Home of Faith, the IRS had assessed deficiencies against Home of
Faith, an S corporation, and mailed notices of adjustment to certain of the
corporation's shareholders.97 One of the shareholders filed a petition in Tax
Court, claiming that the IRS was required to assess the deficiency against the
shareholders separately because the entity-level procedures are not applicable
to S corporations with fewer than ten shareholders. The shareholder also con-
tended that as to him, the statute of limitations had expired, and therefore the
IRS was untimely in asserting the deficiency.9"
In a brief opinion, the Tenth Circuit adopted the view of the Eleventh
Circuit and held that the exemption from the entity-level audit and litigation
procedures, which is extended to partnerships with fewer than ten partners, is
not also applicable to S corporations with fewer than ten shareholders.99
Therefore, the deficiency was assessed in a timely fashion against Home of
Faith.
D. Hall v. Commissioner"
In Hall, the Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held, under the facts
presented, a minister had timely applied for exemption from self-employment
(i.e., social security) tax on amounts earned in the performance of services in
his ministry."' Under the Code, a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed
minister may apply for such an exemption. °2 The application for exemp-
tion"0 3 must be accompanied by a statement that the taxpayer is opposed to
the acceptance of public insurance such as social security, either conscientious-
ly or due to his religious principles."° Generally, however, the application
must be filed by the due date of the return for the second taxable year in
which the minister had self-employment earnings of $400 or more; otherwise,
93. See I.R.C. § 6244 (1988). For a definition of "subchapter S itnes," see I.R.C. § 6245
(1988).
94. Home of Faith, 39 F.3d at 263.
95. Arenjay Corp. v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1991).
96. Beard v. United States, 992 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1993).
97. Home of Faith, 39 F.3d at 263.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 264. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit affirmed an unreported decision of the Tax
Court. See id. at 263.
100. 30 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (1993).
101. See id. at 1307.
102. I.R.C. § 1402(e)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
103. The application is filed on Form 4361.
104. I.R.C. § 1402(e)(1).
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the right to apply for exemption is lost forever. 0 5 Once made, the exemption
is irrevocable."'°
The taxpayer in Hall was ordained as a deacon in the Methodist Church
in 1979.'07 Although his application for exemption from self-employment tax
was due on April 15, 1982, the taxpayer, not being religiously or conscien-
tiously opposed to the acceptance of public insurance, did not file one.'0 8 Af-
ter his application for elevation within the Methodist Church to elder status
was denied, the taxpayer left the ministry in 1983 and went to work as an en-
gineer for five years. However, in 1988, the taxpayer was ordained as minister
in the Community Church of Southport, Indianapolis, and began his ministry
in Colorado Springs."° On January 9, 1989, the taxpayer - having now de-
veloped a belief in opposition to the acceptance of public insurance - filed an
application for exemption from self-employment tax. The application was
denied on the ground that it should have been filed by April 15, 1982.
Hall presented the question whether the taxpayer's "return to the ministry
after a five-year absence, combined with his ordination in a new church and
his acceptance of a new belief in opposition to public insurance" provided the
taxpayer with a second opportunity to elect exemption from self-employment
taxes.'' ° If so, his application would not need to be filed until April 15,
1990, and would be timely. Relying on its prior decision in Ballinger v. Com-
missioner,"' the Tenth Circuit answered this question in the affirmative, con-
cluding that "[w]hen an individual enters the ministry anew in a new church,
having adopted a new set of beliefs about the propriety of accepting public
insurance, it is logical and consistent with the statutory language ... to char-
acterize that individual as a 'new' minister for the purpose of seeking an ex-
emption.""' 2 While concerned that a contrary rule could "arbitrarily and un-
constitutionally interfere with the adherence to sincere religious beliefs by
individuals ... who undergo a genuine religious conversion,""' the court
was at the same time "not concerned that [its] decision will open the flood-
gates for conniving Elmer Gantrys to dupe the Internal Revenue Service and
opt out of the social security system without documenting a legitimate reli-
105. See I.R.C. § 1402(e)(3).
106. I.R.C. § 1402(e)(4).
107. Hall v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (1993).
108. Hall, 30 F.3d at 1305.
109. Hall, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 374.
110. Hall, 30 F.3d at 1305.
111. 728 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1984). In Ballinger, the taxpayer had switched churches, but
his application for exemption was found to have been untimely even if it was true that he was
entitled to a second opportunity to so apply - it was filed five years after he assumed ministerial
duties in his new church, albeit the same year he was ultimately ordained. The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the event triggering the two-year application period was the assumption of duties, and
not the later ordination date. Although deciding against the taxpayer on the facts in Ballinger, the
court noted that it did not agree with the general proposition "that an individual who has a change
of belief accompanied by a change to another faith is not entitled to the exemption." Id. at 1290.
The court concluded that the statute "permits ministers who change churches to qualify" if, unlike
Ballinger, they timely do so. Id. at 1292. The Tax Court in Hall chose to treat this language as
dicta, rather than binding precedent. Hall, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 376.
112. Hall, 30 F.3d at 1307.
113. Id. at 1306.
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gious or conscientious reason to justify their exemption."'" The Tenth Cir-
cuit therefore held the taxpayer's application for exemption timely filed."'
V. PENALTIES AND INTEREST
A. Mauerman v. Commissioner"6
In Mauerman, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a taxpayer who relied on
his tax advisors as to the propriety of a claimed deduction, was not liable for
the "substantial understatement" penalty of former I.R.C. § 6661."' The tax-
payer was a surgeon who had purchased stock in Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc.
("Pre-Paid"), a company which sold prepaid legal service benefits, a species of
insurance under which legal service contracts are sold to individuals for
monthly premiums." 8 Subsequently, the taxpayer became involved as an in-
vestor in a reinsurance arrangement' sponsored by Pre-Paid, under which
the investors - which included the principal officers of Pre-Paid - partic-
ipated in a pooled purchase of contracts issued by Pre-Paid and became
reinsurers of the company. 2 Taking the position that this activity qualified
the individual investors as "insurance companies"'' eligible for preferential
tax treatment under certain now-repealed provisions of the Code, the investors,
including the taxpayer, deducted certain expenditures that would otherwise
114. Id. at 1307.
115. Id. The Tax Court had held that the plain language of the statute did not give "any indi-
cation that a change in faith would give rise to a second opportunity to file an application for ex-
emption." Hall, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 376.
116. 22 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1993).
117. Id. at 1005. See I.R.C. § 6661 (1988) (repealed in 1989), as in effect in 1984 and 1986,
the tax years in question. I.R.C. § 6661 was repealed by the Improved Penalty Administration and
Compliance Tax Act, Subtitle G of Tite VII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(West Supp. 1994)). The current penalty scheme is set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664 (West Supp.
1994). See also Dennis R. Schmidt and Thomas C. Pearson, Civil Penalty Provisions Revamped
by IMPACT, 68 TAxES, Mar. 1990, at 187; Richard C. Stark, IMPACT Makes Fundamental
Changes in Civil Penalties, 72 J. TAX'N, Mar. 1990, at 132.
The substantial understatement penalty of former I.R.C. § 6661 was reenacted as I.R.C. §
6662(b)(2) and (d) (West Supp. 1994). The "substantial authority" standard discussed in the text
was retained in I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1994). No penalty is imposed, however, if it is
shown that there was a reasonable cause for the underpayment (or a portion thereof) and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect thereto. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994). There-
fore, the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Mauerman, to the extent it addresses circumstances under
which a taxpayer will be deemed to have acted in good faith and under which reasonable cause
will be seen to be present, will continue to be of import.
118. Mauerman, 22 F.3d at 1002. For the current tax treatment of such plans when offered as
a qualified employee fringe benefit, see I.R.C. § 120 (West Supp. 1994)
119.
Reinsurance is a common business practice for many insurance companies. Basically, it
is a contract whereby risk is transferred between two parties. The parties to the contract
are the ceding company (reinsured) which wrote the original policy, and the assuming
party (reinsurer) which pays a ceding commission and accepts the business risks and
rewards of the insurance (claims and premium income).
Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1774.
120. Id. at 1774-75.
121. For federal income tax purposes as relevant to the issue at hand for the years at issue,
"insurance companies" were defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1972).
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have been capitalizable under rules applicable to taxpayers other than insur-
ance companies. 122 These deductions were disallowed on audit, on the
ground that the taxpayer was a surgeon, not an "insurance company."1 23 Un-
der I.R.C. § 6661(a) as then in effect, the IRS further imposed a penalty equal
to 25 percent of the deficiency, concluding that the resulting underpayment
was attributable to a substantial understatement of tax and that the taxpayer
did not have "substantial authority" for his tax return position.'24
The only issue in Mauerman was the correctness of the substantial under-
statement penalty. The Tax Court first concluded that, based on applicable
law, the IRS was correct in asserting that the taxpayer did not have "substan-
tial authority" for taking the position that he qualified as an "insurance com-
pany."'2 5 Therefore, the substantial understatement penalty was properly im-
posed, and the only relief available to the taxpayer was to seek a waiver of the
penalty from the Commissioner on the grounds that there was reasonable
cause for the understatement and that the taxpayer acted in good faith.'26 The
taxpayer had done this, claiming that he acted in good faith because he had
reasonably relied on his accountants in the preparation of his return.'27 How-
ever, the Commissioner had denied the waiver. Both the taxpayer's accoun-
tants were attorneys and one was a C.P.A., and neither had any relationship
with Pre-Paid. However, as the Tax Court pointed out, in evaluating the de-
ductibility of the expenses in question, the accountants had relied on informa-
tion provided by sponsors of the program, without independent research.'28
Moreover, as the Tax Court further noted, the taxpayer had made several
investments over the years and "was not a 'babe in the woods"' and should
122. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1775-76. The bulk of the amounts claimed as deduc-
tions were ceding commissions currently paid in respect of the contracts purchased, the premium
income from which would be earned over time. Rather than require capitalization of such
amounts, the Code formerly allowed insurance companies to currently deduct them, even though
the deduction would not be properly matched with the income subsequently to be derived. Former
I.R.C. §§ 809(c)(1) (1988). See also David B. Tatge, Tax Planning Opportunities Through Rein-
surance Still Available Despite TEFRA, 59 J. TAx'N, Oct. 1983, at 260. In the present case, nor-
mal tax accounting rules would have required the up-front ceding commissions to be capitalized
and amortized over the 5-year term of the purchased contracts. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1781.
123. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1776. Other participants in the arrangement likewise
had their deductions successfully disallowed by the IRS. See, e.g., Estate of Baxter v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 1706 (1992); Fisher v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1670 (1992);
Krizer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1598 (1991).
124. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1777. An understatement was "substantial" if it exceed-
ed the greater of 10 percent of the correct tax or $5,000. I.R.C. § 6661(a) (repealed in 1989). This
requirement was satisfied in Mauerman. Under I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B), the understatement could
be reduced by any portion thereof if either (1) the treatment of the item in question was based on
"substantial authority" or (2) the taxpayer adequately disclosed on the tax return or in an attached
statement the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment. The taxpayer in the instant case had
made no such disclosure. See Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1780.
125. See Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1777-80.
126. I.R.C. § 6661(c) (repealed in 1989).
127. Mauerman, 22 F.3d at 1004. Under the then-applicable Regulations, reliance on the
advice of an accountant or an attorney constituted a showing of reasonable cause and good faith if
"under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith."
Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-6(b) (1985).
128. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1782
[Vol. 72:3
TAXATION
have known to have the touted tax benefits of this investment thoroughly
"checked out."'29 Nevertheless, the Tax Court viewed the matter as "a close
question, on which petitioner might prevail" if it were viewing the matter
fresh. 30 The Tax Court, however, concluded that its limited inquiry in this
case was to determine whether the Commissioner had abused her discretion in
failing to grant the waiver, and had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without
sound basis in fact.' M The Tax Court concluded that such was not the case,
and upheld the denial of waiver.'32
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed this latter determination, holding
that the substantial understatement penalty should have been waived.'33 The
taxpayer argued that he had provided his tax accountants with all the informa-
tion in his possession, had not limited the scope of their research in any way,
and merely had "an honest misunderstanding as to the facts or the law which
was reasonable in light of his experience, knowledge, and education."' 34 The
Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that because of the accountants' expertise
and the taxpayer's long-standing relationship with them, it was reasonable for
the taxpayer to trust their advice and not be required "to make sure they had
done sufficient research to give knowledgeable advice."'33
B. Littfin v. Commissioner'36
In Littfin, the Tenth Circuit joined the Second,'37  Fourth,3 ' and
Fifth "'39 Circuits in concluding that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to review
refusals by the IRS to abate interest under the IRS's discretionary authority to
do so." In so holding, the Tenth Circuit did not articulate its own analysis,
but simply adopted that of the Second Circuit. 4' Although the Tax Court has
been granted jurisdiction to make redeterminations of interest in certain cir-
cumstances, such jurisdiction is limited to those cases where the taxpayer has
paid the entire amount of the deficiency plus statutory interest.'42 In the pres-
ent case, the taxpayer had not prepaid the interest component, so jurisdiction
129. Id. The accelerated deductions claimed by the taxpayer eliminated 61 percent of his tax




133. Mauerman, 22 F.3d at 1006.
134. Id. at 1004.
135. Id. at 1006.
136. 17 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1994). See also, Goetz v. Commissioner, No. 94-9000, 1994 WL
446766 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1994) (applying Littfin to another taxpayer involved in same
underlying transaction).
137. Bax v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 54 (2d Ci. 1993).
138. Amlie v. Commissioner, No. 93-1120, 1993 WL 533249 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1993).
139. Frantz v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 990 (5th Cir. 1993) (table); Job v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d
990 (5th Cir. 1993) (table).
140. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346-47. I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (1988) gives the Commissioner the dis-
cretionary authority to abate interest on deficiencies to the extent attributable to error or delay by
the IRS.
141. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346-47 (agreeing with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Bax v. Com-
missioner, 13 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993)).
142. See § I.R.C. 7481(c) (1988).
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was lacking.'43 Moreover, even assuming the taxpayer had prepaid the requi-
site amounts, the relief sought - judicial review of the IRS's decision not to
abate interest - is beyond the scope of the determinations contemplated by
the statutory provision which grants such jurisdiction, and so in any case is
simply not available.'"
The decision of the Tenth Circuit in this regard is consistent with its
earlier decision in Selman v. United States,45 in which the court held that the
Federal district court below did not have jurisdiction to review an interest
abatement decision of the IRS." It now seems well-settled that the decision
whether or not to abate interest is committed to the IRS, and taxpayers may
not obtain judicial review of that decision in either the Tax Court or in district
court., '4
VI. NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY; LAST KNOWN ADDRESS
A. Background
The Code provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue must make
an assessment of taxes, if at all, within three years after a taxpayer files a
return." If the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency 49 in
respect to any tax, the Commissioner is authorized to send a statutory Notice
of Deficiency to the taxpayer by certified or registered mail, informing the
taxpayer of the deficiency proposed to be assessed by the Commissioner.50
The mailing of the Notice of Deficiency is a prerequisite to the making of the
assessment. 5' The taxpayer to whom the Notice of Deficiency is sent may
then file a petition with the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of
143. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346. The taxpayer in Littfin was one of many who accepted settle-
ment offers arising out of the same tax shelter investment which had been challenged by the gov-
ernment. The matter had taken several years to come to a closure, and several of the investors
sought abatement of the statutory interest ultimately assessed on the ground of IRS delay. See id.
144. See Bax, 13 F.3d at 58. The Tax Court is only allowed to determine whether or not the
interest was correctly computed or otherwise exceeds the amount prescribed by the Code. I.R.C. §
7481(c). Here, the taxpayers were seeking an abatement based on alleged delays by the govern-
ment, but there was no claim that the amount assessed by the IRS was not otherwise correctly
calculated. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346.
145. 941 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1991). See James Serven, Taxation Survey, 69 DEN. U. L. REV.
1037, 1060-63 (1992).
146. Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064.
147. Review in the Claims Court is also not available. Brahms v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct.
471 (1989).
148. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (West Supp. 1994). Under certain circumstances, the three year statute
of limitations is extended. For example, if the return omits to include items of gross income that
exceed twenty-five percent of the amount of gross income otherwise reflected in the return, the
statutory limitations period is increased to six years. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1) (West Supp. 1994). In
addition, the statute of limitations is completely open-ended where there has been a false or fraud-
ulent return with the intent to evade tax, where there has been a willful attempt to defeat or evade
tax, or where no return has been filed. I.R.C. § 6501(c).
149. A "deficiency" is defined by I.R.S. § 621 l(a) (1988) to mean, in the context of the in-
come tax, "(1) the excess of statutorily imposed tax over the total of the amount shown on the
taxpayer's return, (2) plus previous assessments, (3) less abatements, credits, refunds, or other
repayments." Keado v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1209, 1210 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988).
150. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1988).
151. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (West Supp. 1994).
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the deficiency set forth in the Notice.' Such a petition must be filed within
ninety days after the date of mailing of the Notice of Deficiency, assuming the
notice is addressed to a person within the United States.'53 During this ninety
day period, the Commissioner is precluded from entering an assessment
against the taxpayer in respect of the deficiency proposed in the Notice of
Deficiency.'54 However, if the taxpayer fails to timely file a petition for re-
determination with the Tax Court within the ninety day statutory period, the
Commissioner is directed to assess the deficiency.'55 The Commissioner may
then commence collection activities against the taxpayer and his assets.
The running of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during the
time that the Commissioner is precluded from assessing a deficiency - that
is, for the ninety days following the mailing of the Notice of Deficiency -
and for sixty days thereafter.'56 Whether or not a Notice of Deficiency has
been validly delivered to the taxpayer so as to be sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations, can be a question of crucial importance to the Commissioner,
particularly where the Notice is sent just prior to the expiration of the three
year period. In the case of an income tax deficiency, the Code provides the
Commissioner with a safe harbor which states that a Notice of Deficiency will
be deemed sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the tax-
payer at his "last known address."'5 Thus, if the Commissioner mails the
Notice by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer's last known address, the
Notice will operate to suspend the statute of limitations as to the taxpayer, de-
spite the fact that the taxpayer may never receive the Notice and may there-
fore be unaware of the proposed assessment. 5 Such a Notice provides a
form of deemed notification to the taxpayer that will ordinarily result in actual
notice; however, actual notice is not required.'59
Whether or not the Notice of Deficiency has been validly delivered is also
of importance to the taxpayer. If the taxpayer fails to file his Tax Court peti-
tion within ninety days of the date of a valid Notice of Deficiency, the taxpay-
er will be forever precluded from bringing his matter to the Tax Court, and
may only obtain redress by paying the asserted deficiency and suing for a re-
fund."6 Taxpayers who have failed to meet the ninety-day deadline often
152. Id. The Notice of Deficiency, also known as the "90 day letter," has been described as
the taxpayer's "ticket to the Tax Court." Delman v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968).
153. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
154. Id. If the taxpayer does file a timely petition with the Tax Court, the Commissioner is
further precluded from assessing the deficiency "until the decision of the Tax Court has become
final." Id.
155. I.R.C. § 6213(c). An " 'assessment,' essentially a bookkeeping notation, is made when
the Secretary or Secretary's delegate establishes an account against the taxpayer on the tax rolls."
Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 170 n.13 (1976).
156. I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994). The statute of limitations is further tolled during
the pendency of court proceedings, if a Tax Court petition is timely filed. Id.
157. I.R.C. § 6212(b)(1) (1988).
158. See Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1985).
159. Brown v. Lethert, 360 F.2d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 1966).
160. See I.R.C. § 7422 (1988). The Tax Court is the only forum available for the litigation of
tax cases that does not require prepayment of the deficiency. "If the taxpayer fails to timely file a
Tax Court petition, but still desires to contest the merits of the deficiency, he must pay the defi-
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seek to invoke Tax Court jurisdiction after the fact by claiming that the Notice
of Deficiency was not properly mailed to the taxpayer's "last known ad-
dress." 6
The question of whether a Notice of Deficiency has been mailed to the
taxpayer's last know address is a mixed question of law and fact. 62 Howev-
er, because the inquiry usually is primarily one of fact, it is generally reviewed
at the appellate level under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 63 The phrase
"last known address" has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit to mean "'that
address to which the IRS reasonably believes the taxpayer wishes the notice
sent.""' While the IRS is required to use "reasonable diligence" to ascertain
the taxpayer's correct address, "the burden is on the taxpayer to provide 'clear
and concise' notice of his current address to the IRS; the IRS is otherwise
entitled to rely on the address shown on the taxpayer's tax return for the year
in question.' 65 Clear and concise notice "is notice by which the taxpayer
indicates to the IRS that he wishes the new address to replace all old address-
es in subsequent communication."'" A "subsequent tax return bearing a new
address provides the IRS with 'clear and concise notice;' therefore, the ad-
dress on the taxpayer's most recent tax return is ordinarily deemed to be his
last known address. 167 "Reasonable diligence" on the part of the IRS does
not require the IRS to send duplicate notices to every address of the taxpayer
known to the IRS." t Moreover, the IRS's duty to exercise reasonable dili-
gence in ascertaining a taxpayer's last known address does not extend beyond
the time when the deficiency notice is mailed, and events subsequent to that
time are ordinarily irrelevant.'"
In 1994, the Tenth Circuit took up two cases which required the applica-
tion of these principles to determine whether a Notice of Deficiency was sent
to the taxpayer's "last known address."
B. Gille v. United States 70
Charles and Vicki Gille filed a joint income tax return for 1982, listing an
Orem, Utah, address.'' Neither Charles nor Vicki filed a tax return for 1983.
They moved to Oklahoma City in early 1985, and filed a change of address
form with the post office. However, they did not inform the IRS of their new
ciency in full and sue for a refund in a United States District Court or the United States Claims
Court." Keado, 853 F.2d at 1212 n.10.
161. See e.g., Gille v. United States, 33 F.3d 46 (10th Cir. 1994).
162. Armstrong v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1994).
163. Id. (citing Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 1437, 1438 (10th Cir. 1992)).
164. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1976)).
165. Id. It is the taxpayer's responsibility to notify the IRS of any address changes. Tadros,
763 F.2d at 91.
166. Cyclone Drilling, 769 F.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Marks v. Commissioner, 947 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
169. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. United States, 864 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1989).
170. 33 F.3d 46 (loth Cir. 1994), rev'g 838 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
171. Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 522.
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address. A Notice of Deficiency in respect of their 1982 return, mailed to
Orem was forwarded to the Oklahoma City address.' In May 1985, Vicki
paid the 1982 deficiency proposed in the Notice, stating in a letter from her
attorney, that she did "not wish to involve her husband in her efforts to re-
solve this matter."' In a subsequent letter the next month, she wrote again
to the IRS, identifying herself as "Vicki Lynn Rebeck (Gille)," giving her so-
cial security number, and providing the IRS with her new address in Oklaho-
ma City.' The IRS recorded Vicki's change of address in October, but did
not record a change of address for Charles. In response to her July letter, the
IRS wrote back to Vicki, specifically referencing Charles' social security
number.'75
In early 1986, Vicki filed a "married but filing separately" return for
1985, reflecting the Oklahoma City address but containing no information
regarding Charles. 7 6 Soon thereafter, the IRS began to look into the couple's
failure to file a 1983 return, and in May 1986 issued a Notice of Deficiency to
Charles at the Orem address. This was returned as undeliverable, as was a
second Notice mailed soon thereafter.'77 Working on parallel tracks, the IRS
mailed a 1986 Form 1040 to Vicki at the Oklahoma City address in December
1986. Vicki completed the form and filed it in early 1987, again filing as
"married filing separately" and setting forth no information about Charles.'78
In January 1987, the IRS filed a "dummy" 1983 Form 1040 for Charles,
using his name and both spouses' social security numbers. The dummy return
still listed the Orem address, despite the IRS's separate correspondence with
Vicki. The tax deficiency shown on the dummy return was assessed on March
23, 1987.'79 A third Notice of Deficiency sent to Charles at the Orem ad-
dress in December of 1987, as well as two notices of assessment similarly
mailed in August and September of 1988, were returned as undeliverable."
In January 1989, Charles moved to Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, not having
filed a tax return since 1982. An IRS revenue officer finally located Charles
through postal tracers. In a letter to the IRS in June 1989, Charles protested
that he had never actually received any of the Notices of Deficiency sent to
him in respect of the unfiled 1983 income tax return.'
The district court agreed with Charles that the IRS has not used "reason-
able diligence" to ascertain Charles' address, particularly given the ease with
which the IRS could have cross-referenced Charles' social security number
with Vicki's and identified the Oklahoma City address as Charles' probable
new address.'82 The district court did not accept the IRS's argument that "ad-
172. Id.







180. Id. at 524.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 526.
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ministrative realities" precluded the IRS from having to cross-reference be-
tween husband and wife."8 3 The court therefore held that the Notices of Defi-
ciency sent to Orem were not sent to Charles's "last known address."'
8 4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed in a brief opinion.' The court
noted that the fact that "Vicki had corresponded with the IRS and had notified
the agency of her new address is not tantamount to notice from [Charles] that
he had also moved, particularly since Vicki had filed separately and pointedly
stated earlier that she did not want to involve her husband in her tax mat-
ters."'8 6 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, tax-
payer, who did not bother to file a tax return after 1982, will not now be
heard to complain that the IRS was not adequately diligent in its efforts to
track him down."'8 7
C. Armstrong v. Commissioner 88
The taxpayer in Armstrong filed a 1988 income tax return showing his
address as P.O. Box 74153, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74153.89 Preparatory to send-
ing taxpayer a Notice of Deficiency on March 2, 1990, the IRS had identified
this tax return as the taxpayer's most recent filed return, and therefore the
address given was considered by the IRS to be taxpayer's last known address.
However, in researching the file, the IRS revenue agent noted that the address
given on taxpayer's 1985 and 1986 tax returns was P.O. Box 35343, Tulsa,
Oklahoma 74153.'" In addition, in connection with the audits of the
taxpayer's returns, the taxpayer had in early 1989 filed a Form 872, Consent
to Extend the Time to Assess Tax, and a Form 2848, Declaration of Represen-
tative, both indicating his address to be P.O. Box 35343, Tulsa, Oklahoma
74153.' 9'
183. Id. The Tenth Circuit has held that cross-referencing between business-related and indi-
vidual return information amounts to an "unreasonable administrative burden." Howell v. United
States, No. 92-3016, 1992 WL 372409, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992) (citing Stein v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 216 (1990)).
184. See Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 526. Finding that the IRS did not act in good faith in failing
to ascertain Charles' correct address, the district court also awarded $16,000 to Charles under
I.R.C. §§ 6103 and 7430 for 16 perceived unauthorized disclosures by the IRS of Charles' tax
return information (mainly as set out in various notices of levy arising from the assessment arising
out of the invalid Notices of Deficiency). Id. at 526-29.
185. Gille, 33 F.3d at 48.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 15 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 1994), affg 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116 (1992).
189. Armstrong, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3117.
190. Id. The taxpayer had quite obviously and erroneously entered 74153 as both the ZIP
code and as the P.O. Box number on his 1988 return. Additionally, the taxpayer had made a trans-
position error on his 1986 return and listed the ZIP code as 74135. However, the revenue officer
had caught this mistake, and used 74153 on the Notice of Deficiency. See id. at 3118 In any case,
while it is "recommended" by the courts that ZIP codes be used, "the ZIP code is not a require-
ment for proper delivery" and the use of an incorrect ZIP code on a Notice of Deficiency and the
mailing envelope "is a de minimum error not fatal to a notice of deficiency." Watkins v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 1710, 1711 (1992).
191. Armstrong, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3117. The incorrect ZIP code was spotted again and
corrected by the revenue agent in the Notice of Deficiency. Id. at 3118.
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The taxpayer previously filed a 1987 tax return indicating his address to
be 4150 S. 100th E. Ave., Ste. 308, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74146.'9' However,
this was the address of his then-accountant, and in response to a letter sent to
that address during the audit in 1989, the accountant informed the IRS that he
was no longer engaged by the taxpayer. 93 The accountant named in the sub-
sequent Form 2848 advised the revenue agent by telephone that the taxpayer's
business address was 417 West 7th, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that the taxpayer
could be reached there. 94 A series of phone calls to that address by the reve-
nue agent were not returned, and at no time did either the taxpayer or his
accountant inform the IRS that the West 7th address was intended by the
taxpayer to be the address to replace the taxpayer's previously-provided
addresses.'
In late 1989, the revenue agent sent a second Form 872 to the P.O. Box
35343 address which was returned marked "unclaimed." In addition, a Form
870, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in
Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment mailed in January 1990, were also re-
turned marked "unclaimed." Finally, the IRS sent a Notice of Deficiency to
the P.O. Box 35343 address, which likewise was returned unclaimed.
9 6
In the Tax Court, the taxpayer asserted that the Notice of Deficiency
should have been sent to the West 7th address, not the P.O. Box 35343 ad-
dress, and therefore was not sent to his "last known address."'97 The court
noted, however, that the only indication the IRS had of this address was a
phone call from the taxpayer's accountant, and that the IRS was unsuccessful
in ever reaching the taxpayer at this address by telephone.' 98 In response to
the taxpayer's contention that the IRS should have used more diligence in
ascertaining the address after the last three pieces of correspondence sent to
the Post Office address were returned "unclaimed," the court countered that
they were not returned marked "address unknown", "insufficient address", or
"no such street." '99 The fair implication of this was that the correspondence
was correctly addressed, but simply refused by the taxpayer.2t" In light of all
the facts, the court concluded that the Post Office address was in fact the
taxpayer's correct and last known address, and that the IRS "reasonably be-
lieved that petitioner wished the notice of deficiency in this case to be sent to
P.O. Box 35343, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74153."2'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Tax Court's conclusions
that the taxpayer had failed to carry his burden of proof in showing that he
192. Id. at 3117.
193. Id.




198. Id. The IRS did in fact contact the taxpayer at that address by telephone, but not until
after the Notice of Deficiency had been mailed. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The taxpayer testified that he had not refused delivery of the correspondence, but the
Tax Court found that he was not a credible witness. Id.
201. Id. at 3119.
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provided the IRS with "clear and concise" notice that his last known address
was the 7th Street address, and that the IRS had exercised reasonable diligence
in ascertaining his last known address, were not "clearly erroneous. ' '2° In so
doing, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that "reasonable diligence does not require
that the IRS send duplicate notices to every address of which it has
knowledge, ' '2°3 and that "the IRS's duty to exercise reasonable diligence in
ascertaining a taxpayer's last known address extends only to the point in time
when the deficiency notice is mailed."' 4
VII. REFUND CLAIMS
A. Richards v. Commissioner"°5
In Richards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision, which de-
nied the taxpayer's refund claim as untimely.2' During 1987, Richards had
$14,131 of income taxes and $1,158 of excess Social Security taxes withheld
from her wages. °7 Under the Code, these amounts were deemed paid in re-
spect of her 1987 income tax return as of April 15, 1988.2' However, Rich-
ards did not file her 1987 tax return until January 23, 1991, subsequent to her
receipt of a statutory notice of deficiency mailed by the IRS on October 22,
1990. Her return claimed a refund of the entire amount of $15,289 of taxes
described above.2" The IRS determined that the refund claim was
untimely." '
The ability of a taxpayer to claim a refund is dependant on at least two
factors: the "filing period" within which the refund claim must be filed; and
the "refund period" for calculating the amount of the refund. Under the Code,
the filing period depends on whether the taxpayer ever filed a return. If a
return is filed, the refund claim must be filed within the later of "3 years from
the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid." ''
However, if no return is filed, the claim must be filed "within 2 years from
the time the tax was paid."2"'
The refund period is dependant upon which of the filing periods the tax-
payer has satisfied. If the taxpayer has met the general three-year filing period
requirement, then "the amount of the.., refund shall not exceed the portion
of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the
202. Armstrong, 15 F.3d at 974-975.
203. Id. at 974.
204. Id. at 975.
205. 37 F.3d 587 (10th Cir. 1994), affg 65 T.C.M.(CCH) 2137 (1993). See also Devich v.
United States, No. 93-1067, 1994 WL 247028 (10th Cir. June 8, 1994) (rejecting taxpayer's
convoluted argument that a past overpayment, now time-barred as to the refund claim, should be
credited to a current underpayment, with the difference refunded to the taxpayer).
206. Richards, 37 F.3d at 587.
207. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2137.
208. Id. See also I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1) (1988).
209. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2137.
210. Id. at 2138.




claim, equal to 3 years, plus the period of any extension."2"3 On the other
hand, if the taxpayer did not meet the three-year filing period requirement,
then "the amount of the ... refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid
during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim."2 4
When a refund claim is asserted in a Tax Court proceeding, however, a
further refund period limitations is applicable. The Tax Court may determine
that an overpayment of tax exists and may allow a refund, but the amount of
the refund depends upon whether, alternatively, (i) the tax was paid after the
mailing of the notice of deficiency,215 (ii) the tax was paid and the refund
claim was filed before the date the notice of deficiency was mailed,2"6 or (iii)
the tax was paid before the notice of deficiency was mailed but no refund
claim had yet been filed on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed (in
which case, notably, the refund claim is deemed filed on the date the notice of
deficiency was mailed).2 7 In Richards, the latter circumstances were present;
therefore, Richards' refund claim was deemed filed on October 22, 1990.8
In the circumstances present in Richards, the Code provides that the
amount of the refund depends upon whether the three-year filing period or the
two-year filing period described above is applicable.2 9 The question in Rich-
ards was, which of the filing periods was applicable? The Tax Court conclud-
ed that a refund claim made on October 22, 1990, would be timely for either:
(i) a return filed on or after October 22, 1987, and before October 22, 1990, or
(ii) taxes paid on or after October 22, 1988, and before October 22, 1990.220
Richards did not qualify under either of these filing periods, and therefore her
refund claim was untimely.
22'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court. The court of
appeals first noted that the phrase "3 years from the time the return was filed,"
as used in the Code, "implies that the taxpayer must file the return prior to
filing the claim in order to benefit from the three-year refund period." '222
However, under a technical reading of the Code, Richards's return was filed
after the date her refund claim was deemed filed. This relegated her to the
two-year refund period. Because the taxes in question were deemed paid on
April 15, 1988, however, her October 22, 1990, refund claim was not time-
ly.
223
The implication of the Tenth Circuit's decision is that a taxpayer seeking
213. I.R.C. § 6511 (b)(2)(A).
214. I.R.C. § 6511 (b)(2)(B).
215. I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3)(A) (1988).
216. I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3)(C).
217. I.R.C. §§ 6512(b)(3)(B).
218. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2138.
219. I.R.C. §§ 6512(b)(2)(B).
220. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2138.
221. Id. at 2139.
222. Richards, 37 F.3d at 589 (emphasis added).
223. Id.; cf Galuska v. Commissioner, 5 F.3d 195 (7th Cir. 1993) (reaching the same con-
clusion as the Richards court on similar facts). In Galuska, however, the taxpayer's refund claim
would not have been timely even if he had brought the suit in a federal district court. Id. at 197.
Thus, the "choice of forum" anomaly was not present in Galuska.
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a refund may be adversely affected by her choice of forum when the taxpayer
receives a notice of deficiency and has not yet filed a tax return for the rele-
vant period. If Richards had filed a refund suit in a federal district court, her
refund claim would have been deemed made by virtue of-and therefore not
earlier than-her filing of the tax return, and not by the earlier date of the
notice of deficiency. 24 Therefore, she would have been eligible for the three-
year filing period, and in turn, the three-year refund "look-back" period would
have been measured from the date of the return. Under the circumstances
present in her case, her refund claim would have been timely because the date
the taxes were deemed paid-April 15, 1988-was within three years of Janu-
ary 23, 1991. While the Tenth Circuit recognized "the potential inequities and
ramifications when the outcome may be dependent on the forum in which the
case was litigated,"" the court nevertheless acknowledged that its "task is




A. Tanaka Brothers Farms, Inc. v. Berger
2 7
The taxpayer in Tanaka Brothers was engaged in the onion farming busi-
ness. The corporation filed a Chapter 11 petition for reorganization on January
7, 1991.28 The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation in May
1991, and a bar date of September 3, 1991, was set. During March of that
year, the IRS had filed a timely proof of claim, clearly indicating that a por-
tion of the claim-that relating to fourth quarter 1990 payroll taxes-was an
estimate, and that the debtor had yet to file payroll tax returns for that period.
Subsequent to the bar date, the debtor filed the relevant tax returns. Based on
the information contained therein, on May 8, 1992, the IRS filed an amended
proof of claim which was some $355,000 greater than the estimated proof of
claim. In the meantime, however, the trustee had negotiated settlement of the
two most substantial claims against the bankruptcy estate, and the bankruptcy
court had approved the settlements. The trustee objected to the second proof of
claim "on the basis that the increased amount was so substantial as to consti-
tute a new and untimely claim rather than a mere amendment. '229 Following
notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court determined that the increased claim
constituted "unfair surprise" to other creditors and the trustee. The district
court affirmed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had
224. Richards, 37 F.3d at 590.
225. Id. at 591.
226. Id. The court concluded, "[a]lthough we find the statutes and their cross-references some-
what convoluted, their import is clear to us and compels the conclusion we have reached in this
case, notwithstanding the fact that a contrary result may have been reached had this case been
litigated in a different forum." Id.
227. 36 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1994).
228. Id. at 997.
229. Id. at 997-98.
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abused its discretion.23 The court of appeals noted that in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, "amendment of a proof of claim is freely permitted so long as the
claim initially provided adequate notice of the existence, nature, and amount
of the claim as well as the creditor's intent to hold the estate liable."23' The
only question in Tanaka Brothers was whether the IRS's original proof of
claim provided adequate notice of the amount of the claim, since it clearly
provided notice of the existence and nature of the claim, and of the IRS's
intent to hold the estate liable.232 Considering all relevant equitable fac-
tors,233 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the original proof of claim provided
adequate notice of the amount of the claim despite its subsequent increased
amount, and reversed the lower courts' disallowance of the amended proof of
claim."'
IX. TAx SHELTERS
A. Hildebrand v. Commissioner235
In Hildebrand, the Tenth Circuit has, one hopes, finally laid to rest pro-
tracted test case litigation236 involving investors in Barton Enhanced Oil Pro-
duction Income Fund and Technology Oil and Gas Associates 1980, some-
times referred to as the Manhattan partnerships237 litigation and the Wichita
230. Id. at 997. The decision of a bankruptcy court to disallow an amended proof of claim is
reviewable under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Unioil, Inc. v. Elledge (In re Unioil), 962 F.2d
988, 992 (10th Cir. 1992). Under this standard, an appellate court will not disturb a bankruptcy
court's decision unless the bankruptcy court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the
bounds of permissible choice under the circumstances. Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 998.
231. Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 998 (quoting In re Unioil, 962 F.2d at 992) (emphasis add-
ed).
232. Id.
233. Courts consider a variety of equitable factors in deciding whether to allow a claim to be
amended. See, e.g., In re Oasis Petroleum Corp., 130 B.R. 89, 91-92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
These factors include:
(1) Whether the parties or creditors relied on the IRS's initial claim, or whether they
had reason to know subsequent proofs of claim would follow pending the completion of
the audit.
(2) Whether other creditors would receive a windfall to which they are not entitled
on the merits by the court not allowing the amended proof of claim.
(3) Whether the IRS intentionally or negligently delayed in filing the amended claim.
(4) The justification, if any, for the failure to request a timely extension of the bar
date.
(5) Any other general equitable considerations.
Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 999.
234. Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 1000-01. Among other factors, the Tenth Circuit noted that:
(1) the estimate was clearly denoted and that all parties were aware that the corrected figures
would be provided when tax returns were filed for the debtor; (2) the creditors and the trustee
could have protected themselves from this eventuality by negotiating a settlement that was condi-
tional upon the final IRS figure; and (3) the increased figure was substantially less than was pres-
ent in the case of In re Stavriotis, 977 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1992), where the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed a bankruptcy court's disallowance of an amended IRS proof of claim. Tanaka Brothers, 36
F.3d at 1000.
235. 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995).
236. Over 2,000 related cases are before the Tax Court pending resolution of the test cases.
Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132, 133 (1992), affd, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995).
237. Technology Oil and Gas Associates 1980 was one of several so-called Manhattan part-
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partnerships238 litigation.239 The tax deficiencies at issue in these cases re-
late back to the early 1980's, and aggregate to an estimated $2 billion.2"
The core issue in Hildebrand involved the validity of deductions claimed by
the partnerships in respect to certain "enhanced oil recovery" (EOR) opera-
tions proposed to be undertaken by the partnerships on land they leased in the
late 1970's and early 1980's.
Generally speaking, the net losses of a partnership may not be deducted
by its partners unless the partnership had actual and honest profit objec-
tives."' Whether the partnership had actual and honest profit objectives is
analyzed at the partnership level.24 The test is "whether profit [is] the domi-
nant or primary objective of the venture," and the burden of proof is on the
taxpayer.243 Whether a taxpayer engages in an activity with the objective of
profit is a question of fact, and is reviewable by the appellate court under a
"clearly erroneous" standard.2" The Treasury Regulations set forth nine ob-
jective factors to be examined in determining when a taxpayer engages in
activities with the objective of realizing a profit. 45 This list is nonexclusive,
and the courts are free to consider other factors.2"
Applying the relevant factors, the Tax Court concluded, in a lengthy opin-
ion, that the activities of the partnerships in question "were not engaged in
with actual and honest profit objectives. '247 Among other factors, the Tax
Court found that (1) the consideration the partnerships agreed to pay to license
the EOR technology they required and to lease their properties "bore no rela-
tion to the value of that which was acquired, did not conform to industry
norms, and precluded any realistic opportunity for profit,"'2" (2) the EOR
nerships. The partnership sold 211.5 units to 132 investors. Krause, 99 T.C. at 137.
238. Burton Enhance Oil Production Income Fund was one of three partnerships that com-
prised the Wichita partnerships. Id. at 150.
239. Id. at 133.
240. Id.
241. Nickeson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1992); Cannon v. Commission-
er, 949 F.2d 345, 350 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3030 (1992).
242. Antonides v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 686, 694-95 (1988), affd, 893 F.2d 656 (4th Cir.
1990); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 505 (1982), affd, 722 F.2d 695 (11 th Cir. 1984).
243. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 350.
244. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review).
245. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) (listing nine factors indicative of a good faith intent
on the part of the taxpayer to recognize a profit). The Cannon court paraphrased the nine factors
as follows: (1) the extent to which the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner,
(2) the taxpayer's expertise or his reliance on the advice of experts, (3) the time and effort the
taxpayer expends in carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity
may appreciate in value, (5) the taxpayer's success in similar activities, (6) the taxpayer's history
of income or loss in the activity, (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, (8) the taxpayer's
financial status, and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 350.
246. See Cannon, 949 F.2d at 350. Other important factors may include a heavy emphasis on
tax benefits of an investment in the venture, and the structure and amount of the fees agreed to be
paid by the venture. See, e.g., Karr v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1082 (1992).
247. Krause, 99 T.C. at 169.
248. Id. The Tax Court found that "all but two of the [EOR] technologies licensed by the
partnerships were undeveloped, untested processes for which no prudent investor would pay any
substantial fixed fees," and that the remaining two processes "could have been licensed by the
partnerships directly from the inventors thereof for running royalties based solely on income real-
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technology itself was for the most part recently developed and commercially
untested, a fact that was inaccurately and misleading disclosed to the partners
in the offering materials,249 (3) the partnerships' estimates of projected oil
recovery from the use of current EOR technology were "not supportable by
credible expert testimony in this case and were not reasonable,"5 0 (4) the
partnerships relied on economic projections that "did not even take into ac-
count or note the abnormal nature and high cost of the license fees and royal-
ties, nor the significant costs of conducting tests and of establishing commer-
cial operations," ' (5) the partnerships further reliance on "projections of tar
sands hydrocarbons or of oil in place, rather than projections of oil reserves"
was a "significant fla[w]" where "[p]rojections based on oil reserves...
would have provided a much more realistic basis" for projections and fees
associated with the EOR technology,252 (6) the partnerships further relied on
projections that "world oil prices would continue increasing from 1979 and
1980 prices on a continuing upward spiral for the next 20 years, 2 3 (7) in
general, the validity and reasonableness of the assumptions used in the offer-
ing materials "were never ascertained, nor was any meaningful or credible
comment or opinion as to the validity and reasonableness of those assumptions
set forth in the offering memorandum or other material, 254 (8) the partner-
ships marketed the investments largely on the basis of projected tax bene-
fits, 25 (9) the fees paid to sponsors and advisors were exorbitant and unwar-
ranted,256 (10) the properties which were to be drilled or mined were over 90
percent depleted, 257 and in some cases were controlled by affiliates of the
partnerships' promoters, who benefitted financially from the inflated and non-
arms'-length consideration paid for the rights to develop the properties,258
(11) the millions of dollars of debt incurred by the partnership in payment of
its licensing fee obligations did not constitute genuine debt and was to be
disregarded,25 9 and (12) the partnerships never did in fact turn a profit for
any year of their operations. In the final analysis, the Tax Court concluded
that the arrangement was "a chain or multilayered series of obligations,
stacked or multiplied on top of each other via the numerous partnerships to
produce debt obligations in staggering dollar amounts, using a largely undevel-
oped and untested product, in a highly risky, very speculative, and nonarms'-
length manner in an attempt to generate significant tax deductions for inves-
ized therefrom." Id. at 171.
249. Id. at 158-59.
250. Id. at 169.
251. Id. at 170.
252. Id. at 169.
253. Id. at 174. This assumption was derived from a "worst case" report published by the
Department of Energy in 1980, prepared at the height of the world energy crisis of the late
1970's. Id.
254. Id. at 169-70.
255. See, e.g., id. at 146.
256. See, e.g., id. at 150.
257. See, e.g., id. at 138, 155-56.
258. See, e.g., id. at 138-39.
259. Id. at 175.
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tors."
260
On appeal the Tenth Circuit determined that the findings of the Tax
Court, including its ultimate fact finding that the partnerships were not en-
gaged in activities with the actual and honest objective of realizing a profit,
were not clearly erroneous. 26' Affirming the decision of the Tax Court, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the Tax Court did a thorough job of considering the
profit motive issue, "ably addressed" all the taxpayers' arguments, and rested
"1262its conclusion on a "solid foundation.
X. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
263
A. United States v. Owen 2"
In United States v. Owen, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction of
David C. Owen, a former Kansas state senator and lieutenant governor, on two
counts of filing false tax returns.265 The tax returns in question were those of
two companies in which Owen was a founder. The first company, Owen &
Associates, had claimed deductions for certain expenses labelled as "consulting
fees."2" It was proven at trial, however, that these amounts were actually
reimbursements to associates of Owen for political contributions they had
made to Mike Hayden's 1986 campaign for governor, at Owen's request.
267
In addition, Owen & Associates failed to include in taxable income a
$100,000 payment received by Owen for assisting an associate to obtain race
track licenses. The company had classified the payment as a loan, but at trial
it was determined that the $100,000 was never expected to be repaid, and was
therefore includable in income when received.2" The second company, Eagle
Distributors, engaged in "a kind of Tinkers-to-Evers-to-Chance transac-
tion"" the end result of which was to reimburse political contributions made
260. Id. at 175-76.
261. Hildebrand, 28 F.3d at 1028.
262. Id.
263. In addition to the cases described in the text, see United States v. Holland, 19 F.3d 1444,
unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 56937 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding the district court's
refusal to dismiss a criminal tax prosecution because the government failed to act in good faith in
bringing the prior criminal prosecution); United States v. Wilson, 19 F.3d 34, unpublished order
reprinted at 1994 WL 75872 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming conviction on four counts of willful
failure to file income tax returns), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 360 (1994); United States v. Belcher,
41 F.3d 1516, unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 642195 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
district court order that (i) retrial after an initial reversal based on trial court's improper jury
instructions does not constitute double jeopardy, and (ii) date of original indictment was proper
measure for tolling of statute of limitations even as to charges set forth in subsequent superseding
indictment where charges not substantially dissimilar to those set forth in original indictment).
264. 15 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1994), habeus corpus granted, 1994 WL 608607 (D. Kan.
1994).
265. Under I.R.C. 7206(1) (West 1994), it is a felony for an individual to make or subscribe
to a tax return which the individual "does not believe to be true and correct as to every material
matter."
266. Owen, 15 F.3d at 1531 n.1.
267. Such contributions, if made by Owen & Associates, would have been nondeductible
under I.R.C. § 162(e) (West 1994).
268. Owen, 15 F.3d at 1531, 1533-34.
269. Id. at 1532.
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to the Hayden campaign under the guise of expenditures for "storage/rent."27
Owen was tried before a jury and convicted. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the conviction over Owen's objections that (1) the government failed
to prove that Owen acted willfully,27" ' (2) the government had failed to show
that the payment for storage/rent was anything but that,272 and (3) the district
court had made errors under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3
B. United States v. Hagedorn274
Lewis Hagedorn and two other persons were charged under a 15-count
indictment arising from certain loan brokerage activities."' In return for a
dismissal of all counts against him, Hagedorn pled guilty to one count of filing
a false corporate tax return.276 The presentence investigation report placed
Hagedorn's base level offense at level 12, on the assumption that Hagedorn
had failed to report income arising from a "criminal activity. 277 The district
court adopted this finding in sentencing Hagedorn. On appeal of his sentence,
Hagedorn argued that the district court erred in finding that the unreported
income came from criminal activity.270
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Hagedorn that the district court's finding of
fact on this issue was erroneous. 279 The only proof the government could of-
fer that Hagedorn was engaged in criminal activity was Hagedorn's admission
that the government could prove all the allegations contained in the Informa-
tion.8 However, Hagedorn had never admitted committing the offenses set
out in the Indictment, and the government had not proven that Hagedorn pos-
sessed the necessary criminal intent to commit the relevant crime.2 1' The
Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the district court's sentence, and remanded for
a redetermination.282
270. Id. at 1534-35.
271. Id. at 1532-34.
272. Id. at 1534-35.
273. Id. at 1535-38.
274. 38 F.3d 520 (10th Cir. 1994).
275. Hagedorn had agreed to act as a loan broker for the Centurion Group of Manhattan,
Kansas, after doing business with another Centurion broker, Vincent Perri. The principal of the
Centurion Group was Eduardo McIntosh. Hagedorn processed several loan applications for Centu-
rion and received advances from the potential borrowers, but Centurion failed to fund the loans.
After unsuccessfully pressing McIntosh for the funds, Hagedom and Perri broke away from Centu-
rion and attempted to get the loans funded from other sources. These efforts were also unsuccess-
ful. Following customer complaints, all three were indicted. Peri and McIntosh pled guilty to one
count each of mail fraud. Id. at 521.
276. See I.R.C. § 7203 (West 1994) (imposing criminal liability on persons who willfully fail
to file a tax return). Hagedorn also agreed to refund advance fees to the potential borrowers.
Hagedorn, 38 F.3d at 521.
277. See former U.S.S.G. § 2T1.2 (1987 version).
278. Hagedorn, 38 F.3d at 522.
279. The Tenth Circuit noted that in criminal cases it will approach claims that the lower
court erred in making a finding of fact deferentially, using a clearly erroneous standard of review.
Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 522-23. Under former U.S.S.G. § 2T1.2.(b)(l), the government was required to
prove that the defendant participated in "criminal activity," defined to mean "racketeering activity"
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 as then in effect.
282. The only remaining issue related to whether the presentence investigation report improp-
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C. United States v. Fleming283
William Fleming was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to violate the
transfer tax provisions of the National Firearms Act284 and one count of
making false statements in order to avoid paying applicable transfer taxes on
firearms. 25 Fleming was found to have participated in a scheme whereby
machineguns and silencers were transferred between private citizens without
payment of the applicable transfer taxes. This was accomplished by employing
"straw" transfers through the Seminole, Oklahoma, police department and the
Creek County, Oklahoma, district attorney's office. 286 The Tenth Circuit up-
held Fleming's conviction... over Fleming's objections, inter alia, (1) that
the trial court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal,2 8 (2) that certain
counts of the indictments were multiplicitous, 289 and (3) that the government
failed to disclose certain evidence as it is required to do under Brady v. Mary-
land.290
erly failed to reduce the magnitude of Hagedorn's unreported income by neglecting to deduct
certain of Hagedom's expenses. If so deducted, Hagedorn would be guilty of committing a lesser
offense. Hagedorn, 38 F.3d at 523.
283. 19 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 93 (1994).
284. I.R.C. §§ 5811, 5812 (West 1994).
285. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1327. I.R.C. § 5861(1) (West 1994) makes it unlawful for any per-
son to knowingly "make, or cause the making of, a false entry on any application required by the
Act."
286. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1327. Transfers to or from such entities are exempt from payment of
the transfer tax under 27 C.F.R. § 179.90(a) (1993).
287. Fleming was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. Fleming, 19 F.3d
at 1327.
288. Id. at 1328. Fleming argued that he had not lied on the applicable transfer forms, be-
cause in form the transactions were structured just as disclosed on the forms. The Tenth Circuit,
however, invoking a familiar rule of construction, stated that it would look "to the substance and
not merely the form of the transfers." The court concluded that "[firom the testimony given, a
reasonable jury could decide that the alleged transfers to government agencies were sham transac-
tions." Id. at 1329.
289. Id. at 1330. Fleming claimed there was only one conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed, finding instead that Fleming had entered into separate agreements to transfer weapons
without paying the applicable transfer taxes. Id.
290. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favor-
able to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment and
the defendant has requested its disclosure). The Tenth Circuit, however, found that the
prosecution's failure to disclose certain information to Fleming did not amount to a Brady viola-
tion. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1331.
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XI. ANNUAL ROUND-UP OF TAX PROTESTORS29
A. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. United States2 92
An annual feature of the Tenth Circuit's calendar is the appearance of the
National Commodity and Barter Association293 and its service wing, the Na-
tional Commodity Exchange.294 In this year's case, the NCBA and the NCE
sued the government for a refund of penalties assessed under I.R.C. § 6698
(for failing to file a partnership tax return),295 and I.R.C. § 6700 (for promot-
ing an abusive tax shelter).296
As to the first penalty, the IRS determined that the NCBA was a "partner-
ship" for federal income tax purposes, 297 and therefore required the organiza-
tion to file partnership informational returns. On review, the district court
291. In addition to the cases described in the text, see Jacob v. United States, 39 F.3d 1191,
unreported decision reprinted at 1994 WL 596798 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1364
(1995) (rejecting "patently frivolous tax protestor rhetoric" and imposing a $500 sanction); United
States v. Scheckel, 21 F.3d 1123, unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 145991 (10th Cir.
1994) (rejecting tax protestor's claims); United States v. Moore, 21 F.3d 1122, unpublished order
reprinted at 1994 WL 95217 (10th Cir. 1994) (enjoining taxpayer from further filing of state UCC
documents, resembling financing statements or security agreements, improperly creating security
interests in personal assets of IRS agents). For background information regarding Moore's dispute
with the IRS, see Moore v. United States, unreported decision reprinted at 1993 WL 260701
(D.D.C. 1993).
292. 42 F.3d 1406, unreported decision reprinted at 1994 WL 664970 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995) (No. 94-1825).
293. The National Commodity and Barter Association (NCBA), conceived by libertarian John
Grandbouche and formed in 1979, is an organization which "'espouses dissident views on the
federal tax system and advocates a return to currency backed by gold and/or silver."' United
States v. National Commodity & Barter Ass'n, 1990-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 91 50,284 (D. Colo.
1990) (quoting Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1985)). The NCBA's leaders
advocate and promote opposition to federal income tax laws. United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d
446, 448 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828 (1989). For a lengthy but by no means ex-
haustive list of reported decisions involving the NCBA, see National Commodity and Barter Ass'n
v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 1406, unreported decision
reprinted at 1994 WL 664970 (10th Cir. 1994).
294. The National Commodity Exchange (NCE) is "operated by NCBA members as a private
or warehouse bank" which the government views as a vehicle designed, among other things, to
obscure the paper trail surrounding the financial affairs of its members. National Commodity &
Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1991). The NCE carries out a wide
variety of financial transactions in its own name, but on behalf of the NCBA's members. Thus,
individual NCBA members are afforded a "high degree of privacy." Id.
295. I.R.C. § 6698 (West 1994) imposes a penalty on any partnership that fails to file an
informational return in compliance with I.R.C. § 6031 (West 1994). The amount of the penalty is
$50 per month multiplied by the number of partners in the partnership. The IRS had assessed the
NCBA $4,223,000 in such penalties for failure to file informational returns for the period 1979-
1988. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 843 F. Supp. at 657.
296. I.R.C. § 6700 (West 1994) imposes a penalty upon persons who organize or promote an
organization, plan, or arrangement and, in connection therewith, either provide false or fraudulent
statements as to its tax benefits, or make a "gross valuation overstatement." The penalty is based
on the gross income derived therefrom. Id.
297. I.R.C. § 761(a) (West 1994) defines the term "partnership" to include a "syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not... a corporation or a trust
or estate."
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upheld the IRS's penalty assessment,298 and rejected the NCBA's argument
that it was not a taxable entity and simply fell "through the cracks" of the fed-
eral tax laws."' The Tenth Circuit held that this issue was not preserved on
appeal.
300
As to the second penalty, the district court once again agreed with the
IRS, and concluded that the NCBA was an abusive tax shelter for purposes of
I.R.C. § 6700.3°0 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this
determination."
B. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Archer
3 3
The NCBA and NCE have also pursued so-called "Bivens claims"3"
against the IRS and several of its employees, alleging violations of the First
Amendment (right to free speech, press, and association) and Fourth Amend-
ment (right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures). In the latest
chapter to this prolonged saga, the NCBA was successful in winning a reversal
of the district court's dismissal of the organizations' First and Fourth Amend-
ment claims, at least as to several of the named defendants. 5
The original lawsuit had been dismissed on the grounds that the claims
against the individual defendants in their official capacities were barred by
sovereign immunity, and that the claims against the defendants in their individ-
ual capacities were barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.3" The dis-
missal was reversed in part in National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs
("NCBA r).07 In NCBA I, the Tenth Circuit remanded NCBA's First and
Fourth Amendment claims for repleading and reconsideration."' The quali-
fied immunity defense was likewise remanded for possible reconsideration in
the event the district court determined that the amended complaint stated a
cause of action on the remanded First and Fourth Amendment claims.3 9 On
remand, in NCBA M, the district court once again dismissed the First and
Fourth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim with sufficient specifici-
298. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 843 F. Supp. at 663.
299. Id. at 662-63. The district court concluded that "[tlhe amount of economic activity en-
gaged in by the NCE and NCBA-buying and selling metals, selling books, underwriting an in-
surance program-simply cannot fall through the cracks of the federal tax laws." Id. at 663.
300. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 1994 WL 664970 at **2.
301. Id. at 665. The district court also rejected the NCBA's constitutional claims, holding that
the penalties did not violate any member's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
or First Amendment rights of free association and free speech. Id. at 665-66.
302. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 1994 WL 664970 at **3.
303. 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994).
304. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (allowing plaintiff to recover money damages where six federal agents violated his
Fourth Amendment rights).
305. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994).
306. See Archer, 31 F.3d at 1523 (explaining the background and procedural history of the
litigation).
307. 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989).
308. Id. at 1248.
309. Id. at 1249.
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ty.3" The dismissal of these claims mooted the qualified immunity de-
fense."' The instant appeal challenged this dismissal.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the NCBA had pleaded its First
Amendment claim with sufficient specificity." 2 The court made a similar de-
termination with respect to the organizations' Fourth Amendment claim,
1 3
particularly because some of the warrants at issue had previously been found
constitutionally defective in Voss v. Bergsgaard"4  The remaining
defendants' qualified immunity defenses in respect to the First and Fourth
Amendment claims were also remanded for certain determinations concerning
the availability of the defenses as to each of the claims. 3 5 The Tenth Circuit
did not remand with directions for trial, and if the qualified immunity defense
is found to exist, the defendants would be entitled to summary judgment (al-
though the NCBA would presumably appeal such a result).316
C. Conklin v. United States3 7
One of the NCBA's more litigious members is William T. Conklin.
Conklin, a self-described "known tax protestor like Jesus Christ, Thomas Jef-
ferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington,"3  has frequently ap-
peared before the courts3 19 in his individual capacity,"' as a member of the
NCBA,32" ' and as representative of various putative church organizations, in-
cluding the Universal Life Church,32 the Church of World Peace,323 and
the Church of Ethereal Joy.324 In the most recent controversy, Conklin was
310. National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 790 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D. Colo. 1991).
311. Id.
312. Archer, 31 F.3d at 1527-31.
313. Id. at 1531-32.
314. 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985).
315. Archer, 31 F.3d at 1532-35.
316. Id. at 1532 n.8.
317. 1994-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,263 (D. Colo. 1994), afftd, 36 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583 (1994).
318. Id. Conklin also describes himself as a "house-husband and homemaker." Church of
Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20, 23 (1984).
319. Conklin has been described as "'an active participant in a widespread abuse of the reve-
nue laws through the promotion of mail-order "churches"' based on findings of fact showing his
connection to the Universal Life Church in Denver and various other 'churches."' Church of
World Peace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2282, 2287 (1994) (quoting Church of
Ethereal Joy, 83 T.C. at 27).
320. See, e.g., Conklin v. United States, 812 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1987); Conklin v. Com-
missioner, 91 T.C. 41 (1988), rev'd, Conklin v. United States, 897 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1990).
321. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Lovell, 974 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1992).
322. The Universal Life Church's tax exemption was originally upheld by the courts. Univer-
sal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974). Some years later, as the
true activities of the church came to light, the Claims Court held that this earlier determination did
not bar the IRS from later revoking the church's tax-exempt status based on a new issue or theory.
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 614 (1986). The church's tax exemption
was subsequently revoked by the IRS. See Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct.
567 (1987), affd, Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 862 F.2d 321 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
323. The Church of World Peace was founded by Conklin in 1977 and was operated from his
residence. The Church's tax-exempt status has now been revoked. See Church of World Peace, 67
T.C.M. (CCH) at 2295.
324. The Church of Ethereal Joy has also had its tax-exempt statuts revoked by the IRS. The
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assessed a penalty under I.R.C. § 6702(a) for filing a frivolous tax return.325
Conklin paid the tax due and filed a refund suit. Conklin's 1987 income tax
return contained little information, was unsigned,326 and reflected a general
Fifth Amendment objection to the return. The district court upheld the imposi-
tion of the penalty and entered summary judgment for the government, con-
cluding -in line with Tenth Circuit case law327-that Conklin's Fifth
Amendment claim was without merit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, 32' and additionally, imposed attorneys fees and double costs against
Conklin.
D. Tavery v. United States
329
Mary Ann Tavery is the wife of William Conklin. 3 ' The case involving
Tavery, however, did not implicate her as a tax protestor. Conklin had been
issued a summons to produce certain records which the government needed for
its investigation of the Colorado Reform Baptist Church. The investigation was
initiated because the IRS did not believe the church qualified as a tax-exempt
entity. 31 Conklin did not respond to the summons. In subsequent contempt
proceedings, Conklin claimed the right to court-appointed counsel, alleging he
could not afford counsel of his own.332 A brief filed by the government con-
testing Conklin's lack of wherewithall contained certain statements of Tavery's
income level, and a list of tax refunds she had recently received.333 Tavery
then sued the government, alleging improper disclosure of tax return informa-
tion.
The district court held that, under applicable provisions of the Code which
sanction the disclosure of tax return information in a judicial proceeding if the
information is "directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceed-
ing,""' 4 the government had acted within its rights when it disclosed the in-
revocation was affirmed in Church of Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20 (1984).
325. I.R.C. § 6702(a) (West 1994) imposes a penalty of $500 on any individual who files
"what purports to be a return" but which "does not contain information on which the substantial
correctness of the self-assessment may be judged," and the conduct is due to "a position which is
frivolous" or due to "a desire ... to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax
laws."
326. Conklin had filed his 1987 personal income tax return, Form 1040, "bereft of informa-
tion, except for a pre-printed label with plaintiffs name and address." Conklin, 94-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 50,263, at 84,069. In an accompanying letter, Conklin explained that he had not com-
pleted the return because he had previously "given District Counsel power of attorney to sign my
returns for me if they can be signed without waiving my constitutional rights." Id. The IRS was
not amused and, after a further exchange of correspondence which resolved nothing, assessed the
$500 penalty against Conklin under I.R.C. § 6702(a).
327. See, e.g., Betz v. United States, 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a general
Fifth Amendment objection to filing a tax return "is not a valid claim of constitutional privilege").
328. Conklin v. United States, 36 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583
(1994).
329. 32 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1994).
330. See Tavery v. United States, 897 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1990).
331. Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1425 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994).
332. Id. at 1426.
333. Id. at 1425.
334. See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B) (West 1994) (tax information may be lawfully disclosed "in a
Federal or state judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration ... if the
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formation. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that Tavery's
income level and tax refunds were relevant to the issue of Conklin's eligibility
for appointment of counsel. Therefore, the government's disclosure of the
information was permissible."
E. Okon v. Commissioner
3 6
Christa Okon, a paralegal living in Santa Fe, New Mexico, declined to file
federal income tax returns for 1985 and 1986. When contacted by the IRS
concerning the unfiled returns, Okon raised a series of specious tax protestor
arguments. 37 In response, the IRS issued Okon a statutory Notice of Defi-
ciency. Okon filed a timely petition33 s in Tax Court for review of the pro-
posed deficiency. The Tax Court dismissed her "very contrived" claims as
frivolous.
33 9
The Tax Court's order was entered on January 27, 1993."4 Okon had 90
days from that date to perfect an appeal to the Tenth Circuit.34' Okon filed a
motion with the Tax Court to vacate its decision, which tolled the appeal
period until April 23, 1993, at which time the motion was denied.342 Okon
then filed a second motion to vacate, not sanctioned by Tax Court rules. This
motion was denied on May 28, 1993, and Okon filed an appeal to the Tenth
Circuit within 90 days of that date, but beyond the original appeal period.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely, noting the general
principle that under existing case law "tolling motions may not be tacked
together to perpetuate the prescribed time for appeal. 3 3 This principle was
seen to be applicable to Okon's actions in filing successive motions to vacate.
Absent a tolling of her appeal period, Okon's appeal was deemed out of time.
The court proceeded to place future Tenth Circuit litigants on notice that,
treatment of an item reflected on such return is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the
proceeding").
335. Tavery, 32 F.3d at 1429.
336. 26 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583 (1994).
337. Reflective of the tenor of her positions regarding the Federal income tax, Okon main-
tained that although she was a United States citizen, she was not liable for income tax unless she
worked abroad, imported goods into the United States, or manufactured or sold alcohol, tobacco,
firearms or narcotics. Additionally, she argued that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had no
jurisdiction over her or authority to determine deficiencies in her income tax. Okon v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1783, 1784 (1993), appeal dismissed, 26 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583 (1994).
338. According to I.R.C. § 6213(a) (West 1994), Okon's petition had to be filed within 90
days following the date of the Notice of Deficiency. Okon's "petition" consisted of a letter to the
Tax Court requesting an extension of time in which to file a petition. The court accepted the letter
itself as a petition, and gave Okon 60 days to amend the petition with a further filing. Okon time-
ly filed her amended petition. Okon, 26 F.3d at 1026.
339. Okon, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1784. Okon's only claim of merit was that the Notice of
Deficiency had not been mailed to her last known address as required by I.R.C. § 6212(b)(1)
(West 1994). The Tax Court, however, noted that Okon received the Notice in plenty of time to
file a timely petition, and that she had in fact done so. Okon, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1786. There-
fore, the Notice was sufficient.
340. Id.
341. See I.R.C. § 7483 (West 1994).
342. Okon, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1784.
343. Okon, 26 F.3d at 1026.
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while the instant case involved successive motions asserting essentially the
same grounds, the doctrine applied by the court here was equally applicable
under appropriate circumstances to "litigants who parcel out objections over
successive post-trial motions,"3 even if on unrelated grounds.
F. Miscellaneous Tax Protestor Cases
In 1994, the Tenth Circuit was called upon to summarily dispose of a
variety of other tax protestor claims, including: (1) that citizens are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the IRS;34 (2) that judges who pay taxes or otherwise
have a "financial stake" in the outcome of a tax case should disqualify
themselves from presiding over the case;3" (3) that the jurisdiction of the
IRS does not extend beyond the boundaries of the District of Colombia and
federal territories;347 (4) that as a citizen of one of the states, such as Colora-
do or Wyoming, a person is a "nonresident alien" not subject to federal taxa-
tion;" (5) that the IRS has not been and cannot be delegated authority to
administer the Code; 349 (6) that there is no statutory authority for imposing
federal income taxes on individuals;35 and (7) that wages are not "in-
come."
351
The Tenth Circuit has ruled that a flat fee of $1,500 will be awarded to
the government as a sanction for frivolous tax protestor appeals.35 In 1994,
this sanction was imposed in several cases. 53
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344. Id. at 1027 n.2.
345. See, e.g., Booth v. Internal Revenue Serv., 37 F.3d 1509, unpublished order reprinted at
1994 WL 563437 (10th Cir. 1994).
346. See, e.g., id.
347. See, e.g., Cotton v. Unites States, 39 F.3d 1191, unpublished order reprinted at 1994
WL 563459 (10th Cir. 1994); Zabel v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 114, unpublished order reprinted
at 1994 WL 263713 (10th Cir. 1994).
348. See, e.g., Cotton, 39 F.3d 1191 (loth Cir. 1994); Haines v. Commissioner, 21 F.3d 1121,
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349. See, e.g., Haines, 21 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 1994); Zabel v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 114
(10th Cir. 1994).
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353. See, e.g., Zabel, 1994 WL 263713 at *1-2; Cotton, 1994 WL 563459 at *2; Booth, 1994
WL 563437 at *2.
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